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The purpose of this paper is to describe the Framework described in [BG16] in a
game theoretic way. The idea behind this is that for modelling security (i. e. the
assumption of an intelligent attacker) the language of game theory seems to be a
very good choice. Game theory can deal with the problem where the actions of
each subject are interdependent, e.g. an attacker will change his strategy whenever
a new security feature will prevent his old strategy from succeeding or a new
attack seems to be more promising. Moreover, game theory has been thoroughly
studied and hence changing the description language of the model, gives access to
many results. Additionally, we view the Beyerer and Geisler Framework as part
of security economics.
1 Introduction
When faced with the task to build or improve a system in terms of both safety
and security at the same time, one has to rely as to the author’s best knowledge
on heuristics and intuition as there exists very little rigorous theory which can be
used in practice. Moreover, we can see that there are serious logical limitations in
achieving safety and security. Take for example the problem of a virus scanner
on a computer. Then perfectly detecting whether a program is either malicious
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or safe to execute is impossible as this would solve the halting problem (see for
example [Coh87]). For the same reason it is impossible to decide in general
whether a program will crash or not. This of course does not imply that we cannot
improve the safety and security of a computer such that it will be good enough
in practice. Another theoretical problem is the uncertainty of the NP=P-Problem,
as for example elliptic curve cryptography relies on the problem that factoring
in the associated group is a computational hard problem, which would brake
down if NP=P would be true (with a reasonable value). Again this does not mean
that we should consider cryptography as unsafe. But it implies that we have to
constantly question our belief about the effectiveness of the cryptography used
and its implementations.
Some security or safety incidents easily lead to monetary loss. The easiest case
is just some amount of stolen money. In many cases likely-hood of a security or
safety incident is quite rare, but in (not exclusively) financial terms the incident
could be catastrophic (e. g. fire, flood-damage, full-loss of data). Further, often a
similar risk for such incidents is shared by many players. In such cases, they could
form a group and pay for each other’s damages. In case the group is large enough
and the risk of each player is independent, then by the law of large numbers they
should only pay roughly the same amount every year. Of course in reality this is
done via buying an insurance (if there is one available for the specific problem).
Of course in some cases such as the loss of data or in case of stolen personal
information of customers the true damage is much harder to quantify and it can be
much more case specific. Also, note that there can be a significant difference in
the damage done to the subject and what an attacker can gain. Think for example
about a blown up automatic teller machine, where on top of the monetary loss,
there are also the costs of repair. Even if there is no damage beyond the stolen
item, there can still be a big gap. Take for example a famous painting, which is if
stolen almost impossible to sell and hence is likely to have a far smaller monetary
value for the thief. A more rigorous type cost analysis for cybercrimes can be
found in [ABB+13]. The paper [Her12] is investigating this type of question by
asking Why Do Nigerian Scammers Say They are From Nigeria?.
Furthermore, this type of economic analysis has been already heavily studied in
the area of internet security. As a starting point for this, see for example the survey
[MA11] or the website[Uni] of Ross Anderson. In the paper [And01] the hardness
of information security is evaluated; It is concluded that information security is
more than the technical problem alone, many problems can be better explained
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with the ideas of microeconomics such as network externalities, asymmetric
information, moral hazard, adverse selection, liability dumping and the tragedy
of the commons.
2 Summary of Beyerer and Geisler’s Framework
We give a short summary of the relevant aspects of the framework for modelling
safety and security introduced in [BG16]. The general idea is that there are several
agents, each of them belongs to a certain role, which is either a sources of danger,
subjects with flanks of vulnerabilities or protectors. The subjects are denoted by a
set S and the set of vulnerabilities of a subject s ∈ S are denoted as Fs. Part of
sources of dangers, which is denoted as D, is purely stochastical, i. e. it resembles
random events. The other agents have subjective views about the world and update
their beliefs according to Bayes’ theorem. More precisely, D splits up into wilful
danger Dw, i. e. the attacker acts intentionally and intelligently to maximise their
utility, and into unintended danger DU, i. e. the result of random events. Further,
DW splits up into DWP where the attacker wants to achieve a purpose1 and into
DWM where the attacks follow only the purpose of the attack itself2. The source
of unintended danger DU splits up into DUC which is the danger coming from
carelessness or negligence3 and DUR purely random events4.
3 Strategic game
In this section, we will now translate the Framework of Beyerer and Geisler to the
language of game theory.
Definition 1. A game is a tuple G = (Ap, up)1≤p≤N where {1, . . . , N} is the
set of players5, Ap is the set of action of player p and up : A → R is the utility
function of player p (i. e. the payoff) where A :=
∏N
p=1 Ap.
1 e. g. copy data, steal money or goods etc.
2 e. g. vandalism
3 e. g. inattention, breach of duties
4 e. g. natural disasters, technical failure etc.
5 In Beyerer2016 this are the agents
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We have 5 different types of players DWP, DWM, DUC, DUR, P . We let the action
space of each player of the game is a subset of the Cartesian product of the union
of all flanks of vulnerability of each subject, i. e.
⋃
s∈S Fs and a subset of the
union of the following; A be the space of all attacks, I be the space of all incidents
and M be the space of all measures (of defence).
3.1 Action space
Each player d ∈ DW has an action space Ad ⊂
⋃
s∈S Fs ×A (which can change
over time, and he can take according to his budget bd(t)). Each player
d ∈ DUC ∪DUR has an action space Id ⊂
⋃
s∈S Fs × I . The players of DU play
their actions at random, but for a player d ∈ DUC we assume that the probability
of causing an incident (i, f) is negatively correlated to
∫ 1
0
k(i, f, β)dβ where
k(i, f, β) are the cost of d for causing an incident i on flank f with success β.
A protector player p ∈ P has an action space Mp. His goal is to minimise the
threats to some subjects Sp ⊂ S and hence Mp ⊂
⋃
s∈Sp Fs ×M . We let M
∗
p be
the action taken by p.
3.2 Utility functions
The utility of a player d ∈ DW for an action (a, f) with success 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 is
ceffort(a, f) + (cpenalty(a, f) Pr(penalty|a, fβ) + g(f, β)).
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p as their action. The idea here is that the
application of a measure will decrease the probability of success of some attack




M∗p , a, f, β)p(β|
⋃
p∈P
M∗p , a, f)dβ
be the definition of the utility of the player for the action (a, f).
A Game-Theoretic Framework for Safety and Security 71
An action m(f) ∈ Mp costs the player c(m(f)).6 But applying similar measures
to different subjects potentially reduces cost per measure (economies of scale).7
The overall actions he can take are according to the budget given, i.e. b(p). Apply-
ing the measures M∗p will cost the protector
∑
m∈M∗p c(m(f)). The protector’s












M∗p , a, f)dβ.
Now we are finished with our definition of the game. Each player now has an
action space and a utility function which is interdependent on the actions the other
players choose. We can now start reasoning about this model by applying game
theoretic results. So we can conclude, if we assume that the utility function is
continuous (or each player has only finitely many actions) and the action spaces
are compact metric spaces, that then the game has a Nash equilibrium. If we are in
doubt whether our agents will behave fully-rational, we could use other strategies
as suggested in [WLB17].
What we have not dealt with is the issue that the success of an attack depends on
the success of other attacks or incidents of players. Take for example the hostile
takeover of a computer for the purpose of bitcoin mining, now if another attacker
has also access to the very same computer and also uses it for bitcoin mining
then the expected gain should only be less than half of what would be otherwise
expected. Even worse if some thunderstorm destroys the computer, before any
bitcoins can flow, then the gains should be zero.
6 Note that a measure costs can change over time, such as some measures have a large initial cost but
then cost almost nothing (e. g. a fence).




A producer of security measures wants to decide whether he should develop some
security measure m. He estimates the fix costs at cm and the cost per measure
applied as ca. Now he wants to know whether he can sell enough measures (let S








x ≥ 0. (3.1)
For that we have to determine, if there exists new games where measure m is
available for to all the protectors P for a certain price x, enough protectors are
going to apply the measure m for their price such that Equation (3.1) is full-filled.
Note that the price of the producer is not necessarily the price of the protector.
Take for example a big fence with some barbed wire, it may not be allowed to
install (so we may assume that the costs for the protector would be infinite). Or
the protector has to stop the production line of his company in order to install the
measure, which will then of course result in additional costs.
4 Bayesian game
We extend the above game to follow the rules of Bayesian game. As in the above
game, it is assumed that all the players will have full knowledge about their own
and the others players’ action spaces and utility functions. In a Bayesian game on
the other hand, the player have only incomplete information available, but have
beliefs about the action spaces and utility functions of the other players. So lets
first formally define what a Bayesian game is.
Definition 2. A Bayesian game is a tuple Γ = ((Ti, Ti), Ai, ui, p)1≤i≤N with
A :=
∏N
i=1 Ai and T :=
∏N
i=1 Ti where
• {1, . . . , N} is the set of players;
• (Ti, Ti) is a measurable space8, where Ti is the i’s non-empty type space.
Further we let T = ⊗Ni=1Ti;9
8 Note that, if Ti is discrete, then we may ignore Ti, as in this case it is the power set.
9 The product σ-algebra.
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• Ai is the space of actions of player i, a non-empty metric space10






• p is a probability measure on (T, T ) which denotes the common prior over
the type profiles.
Now if we want to model the Beyerer-Geisler framework as a Bayesian game we
need to define the type space T . The type space Tp for player p in P con-
sist of tuple of functions which map the objective costs and objective prob-
abilities to the player’s subjective view. So it consists of functions νp,c(m)
which maps the objective cost of some measure m (on flank f of subject
s) to the subjective cost of p. Also, some function νp which maps c(f, β)


















j , s, f) to those subjectively assumed by p. We may also
assume that the player p does only know his type up to some probability mea-
sure Xp on Tp Together this leads to some new subjective utility function
Rp,
⋃
p∈P M∗p (νp,c(m), νp, πp).
The type space for player d in DW consists of a map νd,c(a) which maps the
objective costs ceffort(a, s, f), (cpenalty(a, s, f) and g(s, f, β)) to the subjective
costs of d. Also, there is a function πd which maps Pr(penalty|a, s, f, β) and
p(β|a, s, f). to the subjective probabilities assumed by d. Again we may assume
that the player d only knows his type up to some probability measure Xi.
Having set up the framework of Beyerer and Geisler like this we can apply
the results of [CNM14] and know that the game (under some minor continuity
assumptions or in the discrete case) has a Bayes-Nash-equilibrium.
5 Introducing temporal dynamics
We introduce some temporal dynamics now. So assume that the finite time horizon
is given by T = {0, 1, . . . , k}. Now the state of the system has three components
10If Ai is finite, we may assume that it is a set without any additional structure.
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at time i: The type space (Ti, Ti), the common knowledge (prior) pi and the






p) of player p. We denote the action
space at time i of each player p Api . Note that the action space of an protector
player depends on bp(t). We may also assume that rather than having a new
budget every round a protector player has fixed amount of money for some fixed
number of rounds, say tk′ . So the action a player can take depends on the actions
already taken.
For a player in d ∈ DW , the actions the player can take are again limited by his
budget bd(t) plus sometimes he can reinvest the eventual gains. Again he may
assume that d has some fixed amount of money for some fixed number of rounds,
say tk′ . So the action a player can take depends on the actions already taken.
So in this case if the subjective assumption of the players match the private
assumptions, hence if our model is a non-Bayesian game, we can think of this
temporal dynamic as an extensive-form game. When the game is finite, we can
think of such a game in terms of a game tree. This game has again Nash-equilibria,
but in this context they can be unrealistic. A solution to this problem are subgame
perfect equilibria, which compared to ordinary Nash-equilibria have the additional
property, that they are also equilibria for every subgame. Their existence can be
shown via backward induction.
In terms of the Bayesian game model, we can go over to sequential Bayesian game.
Again the concept of Bayes-Nash-equilibrium leads to unrealistic equilibria, but in
case our game is finite, we can show the existence of perfect Bayesian equilibria
which overcome this issue.
Another idea would be to use the framework of [OTT17]. This framework assumes
that the common knowledge evolves as
Pi+1 = fi(Pi, Ai,W
C
i ),
where fi is function of common knowledge and WCi is a random variable which
represents the randomness of the evolution. Then we assume that a player observes







where WCi is again a random variable which represents some random noise. We
further assume that fpi is common knowledge among all players.
11 There are no
11This just means that if the players would swap their positions they would observe the same.
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hard general results for this type of framework, but it is at least suspected that
there exist equilibria solutions for this framework in general.
6 Conclusion and future work
We redefined the framework of Beyerer and Geisler in terms of game theory. This
opens access to a deep theory for example the existence of the Nash equilibria.
This immediately raises the question on the suboptimalities of these stability
points of the game in terms of the social optimum (cf. [GCC08]). Moreover, many
other results of game theory seem to be relevant as well, such as the study of how
humans behave in these kind of strategical interactions. What also can be seen is
that the task of the protector player can be a very hard problem. Not only do they
have to think about their own flanks of vulnerabilities, but they also have to get a
good idea of the adversary’s capabilities and their motivation, e. g. their utility
function.
We raise the question whether we can improve our predicting abilities of different
security polices. Take for example the choice of password polices. Could we
have predicted that the policies of forcing to change the passwords regularly will
lead to questionable security (cf. [ZMR10]). Another question we can ask is the
model’s ability to predict what happens for the problem, when the protector does
not have to bear the cost of failure. This is for example the case for proprietary
software, the protector is the copy-right holder but the one who will suffer first is
the user (cf. [MA11]).
This leads to the question of how the model we defined can be used apart for a
purely theoretical quality analysis. One idea we want to investigate in the future
is the question whether multi-agent simulations with our model in mind will lead
to good predictions in terms of security engineering but also in terms of what
political decisions such as the European General Data Protection Regulation will
achieve for the personal data protection of its citizens.
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